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Contemporary labor organizing, with all its vibrance, variety, and vig-
or, seems to be in a virtuous cycle in which organizing success prompts 
favorable public attention, which in turn contributes to more organizing. 
More employees struck in 2019 than in any year since 1986.1 Since 2010, 
support for unions has climbed from less than half of Americans polled to 
about three-fifths.2 Some economists now believe that unions are “a critical 
check on the tendency of capital to vacuum up the gains from economic 
growth.”3
The institutions, movement, and organizing of labor today differ, in 
some ways quite markedly, from those that existed when the legal regimes 
governing work were developed. How organizations form and represent 
workers, how labor organizations relate to employers and consumers, what 
are desired subjects of labor negotiation, and how minimum standards laws 
* Barbara Nachtrieb Armstrong Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley. Portions of this 
essay (in particular, the discussion of social movements in Part II and the two reforms proposed in Part 
III) draw heavily on prior work co-authored with others. I am grateful to Seema Patel, Diana Reddy, 
Jennifer Abruzzo, and David Rolf for their work that made it possible for me to do the synthesis and 
elaboration in this article, to Laura Weinrib for perceptive comments, and to Michael Oswalt, Cesar 
Rosado Marzan, and the staff of the Chicago-Kent Law Review for organizing the Alt-Labor symposi-
um for which this essay was written.  
 1.  Scott Horsley, ‘It’s Time To Get Something Back’: Union Workers’ Voices Are Getting 
Louder, NPR (Oct. 23, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/10/23/772760183/it-s-time-to-get-something-
back-union-workers-voices-are-getting-louder [https://perma.cc/U8QK-8C4E].
 2.  Shiva Maniam, Most Americans See Labor Unions, Corporations, Favorably, PEW RES. CTR.
(Jan. 30, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/01/30/most-americans-see-labor-unions-
corporations-favorably/ [https://perma.cc/P6YK-5BBW]; Drew Desilver, Most Americans View Unions 
Favorably, Though Few Workers Belong to One, PEW RES. CTR. (Aug. 30, 2018), 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/08/30/union-membership-2/ [https://perma.cc/X59C-
4NUZ]; Favorability Ratings of Labor Unions Fall Sharply, PEW RES. CTR. (Feb. 23, 2010), 
https://www.people-press.org/2010/02/23/favorability-ratings-of-labor-unions-fall-sharply/ 
[https://perma.cc/6BGA-UWDK]. 
 3.  Noam Scheiber, Candidates Grow Bolder on Labor, and Not Just Bernie Sanders, N.Y.TIMES
(Oct.11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/10/11/business/economy/democratic-candidates-labor-
unions.html [https://perma.cc/XX2G-432R] (citing Henry Farber et al., Unions and Inequality Over the 
Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data (Princeton Univ. Working Paper No. 620, 2018), 
http://arks.princeton.edu/ark:/88435/dsp01gx41mm54w. Among the prominent economists focused on 
the reasons for and the hazards of rising economic inequality, one might list Joseph Stiglitz, Thomas 
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intersect with collective agreements are evolving as the nature of work 
evolves. Even where the organizational forms and tactics look similar—
such as recent strikes by unionized teachers in Chicago, Los Angeles, and 
Oakland, auto workers at GM, or telecom workers at Verizon—many of the 
goals are radically different. Teachers, for example, have struck for the 
common good—an end to the disinvestment in public education—not just, 
or not even, a pay raise.4 Beyond the blue states with strong teachers’ un-
ions, many of the strikes were led by groups formed on Facebook, not by 
union leaders.5 Worker centers nationwide are organizing millions of low-
wage immigrant workers to demand compliance with minimum wage laws 
even where a union and collective bargaining are far beyond what the 
workers could imagine. And a host of organizations, working with and 
sometimes without unions, have supported the Google walkout, organizing 
 4.  See, e.g., Holly Yan, Oregon Teachers Are Walking Out, Forcing 600 Schools to Close. But 
They’re Not Demanding Raises, CNN (May 8, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/05/08/us/oregon-
teachers-walkout/ [https://perma.cc/U8A9-VTVJ]. In the negotiations that led up to the Los Angeles 
teachers’ strike of 2018, the United Teachers of Los Angeles made a package of proposals that the 
teachers labeled “Supporting our Students and Empowering our Community.” One was that the Los 
Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD”) work toward creating 20 “community schools” in high-
need areas. A second was that the district develop a plan to expand access to early education. A third 
proposal asked the district to remove unused bungalows on campuses to make room for more green 
space for student athletic activities. A fourth would require an “education impact report” and a “com-
munity impact report” as part of the authorization process for a new charter school or a new public 
school. A fifth asked the district to provide on campus support for homeless students, including coun-
seling and contacts with nonprofit organizations on housing assistance. A sixth sought to require the 
district to collaborate with labor to develop a plan for certificated employees to support classified 
employees who are accessing the Training Fund to become teachers. A seventh sought support for 
immigrant students’ families by training district personnel on the protocols for district interactions with 
the U.S. Department of Immigration & Customs Enforcement, by creating a $1,000,000 fund to support 
families of LAUSD students facing deportation of a student or family member, and developing a plan to 
locate immigrant support clinics that could provide on-site support at LAUSD schools. An eighth 
proposal was to cease subjecting students to “random” metal detector and locker searches, to provide 
fare-free ridership on all MTA buses and all trains for all LAUSD students, to support efforts to end the 
MTA’s disproportionate number of citations, fines, and “stop & frisks” for those under the age of 
twenty-one, and to offer support services for students who need help addressing legal issues arising 
from these situations relating to the MTA. The ninth, and perhaps most ambitious, proposal asked the 
district to approve a resolution in support of and to formally advocate that Los Angeles schools be 
funded at $20,000 per pupil by the year 2020.  
LAUSD filed an unfair practice charge against the Union that UTLA insisted to impasse on the Com-
munity Proposals and that they were outside the scope of bargaining. Unfair Practice Charge, Los 
Angeles Unified School District v. United Teachers Los Angeles, PERB Case No. LA-CO-1760-E (Aug. 
28, 2018). The California PERB issued a complaint on the LAUSD charge, but the questions whether 
the LAUSD’s failure to inform UTLA whether it was willing to discuss the proposals, or whether some 
or all were outside the scope of the duty to bargain over mandatory subjects, were among the many 
legal issues left unresolved in the wake of the strike settlement. 
 5.  See Michael M. Oswalt, Alt-Bargaining, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (2019). In California, 
the teachers’ union is pushing a ballot measure, which they call the “Schools and Communities First” 
initiative, that would close commercial property tax loopholes in order to increase revenues for schools. 
Julian Peeples, CTA Kicks Off Campaign to Put Schools and Communities First, CALIFORNIA 
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of gig workers, a $15 minimum wage, labor rights for domestic and home 
care workers, an end to misclassification as contractors, and an end to the 
tipped employees’ subminimum wage so as to end sexual harassment for 
restaurant workers.6
These new forms and activities of labor organization and protest, and 
new forms of labor market intervention and intermediation are the Alt-
Labor phenomenon.7 To build enduring worker power from the activism 
and organizations of Alt-Labor requires thinking about how law could help 
create institutional leverage for worker groups.8 Institutional leverage will 
make Alt-Labor gains sustainable. But history teaches that capitalists are 
patient and indefatigable whenever they think they can make more money 
if labor is cheaper. For example, the gains of the New Deal have been all 
but lost in the deregulation and union-busting since 1970.9 If today’s organ-
izing produces a new wave of labor power in blue states or nationally, 
those gains will be vulnerable to a pro-business counter-revolution.10
 6.  See generally SARU JAYARAMAN, FORKED: A NEW STANDARD FOR AMERICAN DINING 
(2016); DAVID ROLF, THE FIGHT FOR FIFTEEN: THE RIGHT WAGE FOR A WORKING AMERICA (2016);
see generally Sameer M. Ashar & Catherine L. Fisk, Democratic Norms and Governance Experimen-
talism in Worker Centers, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141 (2019) (collecting citations to the literature on 
new forms of labor organizing, activism, and representation, especially in low-wage, immigrant, fe-
male-dominated work). 
 7.  The literature on this is large and growing. See, e.g., M. Anne Visser et al., From Economic 
Integration to Socioeconomic Inclusion: Day Labor Worker Centers as Social Intermediaries, 38 
URBAN GEOGRAPHY 243, 247 (2017); CHRIS ZEPEDA-MILLÁN, LATINO MASS MOBILIZATION:
IMMIGRATION, RACIALIZATION, AND ACTIVISM (2017); Janice Fine, Community Unions and the Revival 
of the American Labor Movement, 33 POL. & SOC’Y 153 (2005); JANICE FINE, WORKER CENTERS:
ORGANIZING COMMUNITIES AT THE EDGE OF THE DREAM (2006); SHANNON GLEESON, CONFLICTING 
COMMITMENTS: THE POLITICS OF ENFORCING IMMIGRANT WORKER RIGHTS IN SAN JOSE AND 
HOUSTON (2012); JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT RIGHTS
(2005); SANDRA LAZO DE LA VEGA & TIMOTHY J. STEIGENGA, AGAINST THE TIDE: IMMIGRANTS, DAY
LABORERS, AND COMMUNITY IN JUPITER, FLORIDA (2013); RUTH MILKMAN ET AL., WORKING FOR 
JUSTICE: THE L.A. MODEL OF ORGANIZING AND ADVOCACY (2010); RUTH MILKMAN & ED OTT, NEW 
LABOR IN NEW YORK: PRECARIOUS WORKERS AND THE FUTURE OF THE LABOR MOVEMENT (2014). 
 8.  See Michael M. Oswalt & César F. Rosado Marzán, Organizing the State: The “New Labor 
Law” Seen from the Bottom-Up, 39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 415 (2018) (asserting, based on 
ethnographic study of new forms of labor protection, there is need for more law urging or mandating 
collaboration between worker organizations, employers, and government agencies).
 9.  See Nelson Lichtenstein, From Corporatism to Collective Bargaining: Organized Labor and 
the Eclipse of Social Democracy in the Postwar Era, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER,
1930-1980 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle, eds., 1989); JEFFERSON COWIE, THE GREAT EXCEPTION: THE 
NEW DEAL AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2016); STEVEN GREENHOUSE, BEATEN DOWN,
WORKED UP: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN LABOR (2019). 
 10.  On the fragility of social change that is achieved only through networked activism rather than 
through institutional change, see ZEYNEP TUFEKCI, TWITTER AND TEAR GAS: THE POWER AND 
FRAGILITY OF NETWORKED PROTEST (2017) (analyzing how the internet and social media enabled 
protest movements to gain significant power around the globe, including in the Arab Spring uprisings of 
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Some Alt-Labor formations use mobilization for legal change as a ba-
sis for forming sustainable sectoral organizations. Grassroots campaigns to 
push for new legislation, and to push for compliance with existing legisla-
tion, engage workers at a local level on sector-wide issues. As Kate Andri-
as has shown, it is a first step toward sectoral bargaining.11 And there will 
always be the next campaign to improve labor standards through state and 
local legislation. But the key to long-term sustainability is to understand 
how organizations sustain engagement or otherwise exert power after the 
push for a particular piece of policy change has passed. 
Looking at successful state campaigns to enact new labor laws— pro-
tections for informal workers (day laborers and domestic workers), im-
proved minimum standards in food service, and litigation and legislative 
strategies to eliminate misclassification of workers as independent contrac-
tors—this essay considers how the campaigns that have mobilized workers 
have sought to institutionalize the gains of movement activism. The essay 
then draws on the experience of the United Farm Workers under the Cali-
fornia Agricultural Labor Relations Act, which won a major legislative 
reform but failed (to this point) to build a sustainable union, and teachers’ 
unions which have recently revolutionized public employee bargaining and 
activism, to raise questions about how the new generation of worker for-
mations are addressing the sustainability challenge that all social move-
ments face. 
A successful labor organization is one that has a mechanism to trans-
form the mobilized energy of a social movement into sustainable worker 
power.  Unions have kept members mobilized to secure collective bargain-
ing agreements and, in the interim, have offered the benefits of the contract. 
Collective bargaining agreements translate the power that is gained through 
activism into enduring improvements in working conditions, relying on 
institutional power as a partial antidote to activism fatigue. As Michael 
Oswalt has shown, Alt-Labor has transformed collective bargaining in 
many ways.12 But worker centers and nonprofits need more ways in which 
gains in worker power secured through the new wave of organizing and 
activism can be institutionalized and sustainable without constant social 
movement activism. 
As described in Part III, two state or local legal changes would facili-
tate sustainability and could operate as a form of proto-sectoral bargaining. 
One is co-enforcement, which gives alt-labor formations an institutional 
 11.  Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 8 (2016). 
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role in enforcing labor standards laws. A second is the expansion of hiring 
halls, perhaps even a requirement that any job-matching service involves 
worker formations in its operation. They are, in a sense, proto-sectoral bar-
gaining that will enable worker formations to keep members engaged and 
build a sustainable organization to combat the activism fatigue that can 
weaken social movements over the long term. 
I. THE SECTORAL AND CAMPAIGN MODELS OF WORKER ORGANIZING
The dominant mode of alt-labor action has been organizing, and in 
particular the campaign around creating new law or enforcing existing law. 
Yet the social movement literature cautions advocates of progressive law 
reform to beware the backlash that often follows the in-the-streets and in-  
the-courts phase of social movement organizing.13 The dangers of backlash 
and exhaustion are compounded in the area of labor standards because 
repressive immigration law, the multidimensional nature of socioeconomic 
inequality, and the fissuring and informalization of work generate social 
exclusion and demand more labor market intermediation.14 Alt-labor for-
mations have in many cases effectively combatted social exclusion through 
activism. But a regulatory regime should not depend on constant activism 
and should instead create structures that normalize compliance. 
Legal reforms can both create sustainability and facilitate social and 
economic inclusion by giving worker organizations a formal role to play in 
regulating, not just an informal role in labor market regulation. 
As immigration law has become ever harsher and economic restructur-
ing and deregulation have rendered immigrant and low-wage workers ever 
more marginalized, worker organizations and other community formations 
have scored some notable successes in demarginalizing vulnerable workers. 
They also play a role in improving the skills of the workforce and regular-
izing the labor market in ways that benefit employers and consumers. In 
this section, I explore how worker organizations in three sectors—
“informal” work (day labor and domestic work), food service, and the app-
based gig economy—have forged their role. Yet, their role remains focused 
on activism and campaigns, and the long-term viability and power of these 
organizations may depend on their development into sustainable labor mar-
 13.  For a recent discussion of the backlash thesis and a response to it in the case of same-sex 
marriage litigation, see Reva B. Siegel, Community in Conflict: Same-Sex Marriage and Backlash, 64 
UCLA L. REV. 1728 (2017).  
 14.  Social exclusion is “the marginalization of individuals and groups from ‘mainstream’ social, 
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ket and social institutions for the benefit of workers, employers, and the 
public. 
A. “Informal” Work 
The emergence of local, regional, and nationwide organizations of 
domestic workers and day laborers that exercise real power is, scholars 
have said, “unexpected.”15 The work has been regarded as informal, at 
most, and even as not work at all. It is decentralized and isolated in private 
residences, invisible to the public, poorly paid, and dominated by immi-
grant people of color who often have no legal status in the United States. 
That these organizations have succeeded in enacting minimum labor stand-
ards laws and in fending off legal attacks on their members is astonishing. 
A threshold challenge in domestic worker organizing was convincing 
policymakers that domestic work is labor, not “help,” and that as labor it is 
worthy of legal protection. Although domestic worker organizations 
formed before the 1960s both as worker-led unions and as elite or middle-
class feminist-led nonprofit associations,16 the last decade or more of or-
ganizing has been an immigrant female worker-led campaign spearheaded 
by the sixty-plus local organizations that have affiliated to become the Na-
tional Domestic Worker Alliance (NDWA). NDWA, through its affiliates 
in more than thirty cities, has secured the enactment of domestic worker 
bills of rights in ten jurisdictions, and is developing online platforms to 
facilitate the hiring of in-home care and cleaning workers and to provide 
portable benefits for workers.17
Contemporary domestic worker organizations came out of the local 
immigrant community organizations.18 The campaign’s law reform goal 
 15.  Hugo Sarmiento et al., The Unexpected Power of Informal Workers in the Public Square: A 
Comparison of Mexican and US Organizing Models, 89 INT’L LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 131, 132 
(2016) (explaining why, “[d]espite their apparent vulnerability,” Mexican street vendors and U.S. day 
laborers “have built perhaps the most powerful informal worker organizations in their countries.”). 
 16.  Chris Tilly, Georgina Rojas-Garcia & Nik Theodore, Intersectional Histories, Overdeter-
mined Fortunes: Understanding Mexican and US Domestic Worker Movements, in GENDERING 
STRUGGLES AGAINST INFORMAL AND PRECARIOUS WORK, POLITICAL POWER AND SOCIAL THEORY
121 (Rina Agarwala & Jennifer Jihye Chun eds., vol. 3 2019); see also Eileen Boris & P. Nadasen, 
Domestic Workers Organize!, 11 WORKINGUSA: J. LAB. & SOC’Y 413 (2008). 
 17.  See NATIONAL DOMESTIC WORKERS ALLIANCE, http://domesticworkers.org 
[https://perma.cc/PS7F-2848] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (describing the goals and successes of the 
NDWA); NDWA LABS, http://ndwalabs.org [https://perma.cc/RAM3-GK6A] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) 
(developing new approaches to improving labor standards in domestic work); MY ALIA,
http://myalia.org [https://perma.cc/4WPL-WUH7] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020) (online platform to provide 
portable benefits). 
 18.  Hina Shah, Notes from the Field: The Role of the Lawyer in Grassroots Policy Advocacy, 21 
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has been to secure enactment of federal or state domestic worker bills of 
rights and to get administrative action interpreting existing wage and hour 
laws to cover domestic workers.19 More important than law reform, how-
ever, has been its goal of empowering domestic workers.20  Both the social 
agenda and the legal agenda have involved building worker-led organiza-
tions, but the goal has not been collective bargaining that federal labor law 
envisions as the goal of worker organizing. The major recent legislative 
wins have been the enactment of bills of rights in New York, Hawaii, and 
California, and an Obama Administration Department of Labor determina-
tion that extended minimum wage protections to home care workers.21 And 
yet some criticize the process and results of these legislative campaigns, 
arguing that the legislation still excludes too many workers, “does little to 
change the actual conditions of domestic workers, while at the same time 
lending credibility to the legislative and legal regime.”22
Day labor organizations take a variety of forms. Scholars have distin-
guished between worker centers that educate and organize day laborers 
(among many other workers) in legislative, judicial, and policy advocacy, 
and day labor centers which serve primarily to match day laborers with 
employers.23 Organizations of domestic workers and day laborers have 
three different levels: the very local (perhaps even neighborhood), the city 
or regional, and the national, which is typically a federation of local organ-
izations.24 They affiliate with other organizations, including unions and 
NGOs. They operate as labor intermediaries that regularize and make jobs 
transparent to both job-seekers and employers, and offer work-related train-
ing and other services to upgrade the skills of the workforce. They act like 
unions in seeking to raise wages and improve safety and other working 
conditions by organizing and advocating (although not typically by bar-
gaining directly with employers in a formalized way), and by conducting 
public protests when necessary. And they act like community organizations 
in engaging and educating workers over a range of political and social is-
sues, including politics, immigration, and leadership development.25
 19.  See generally NATIONAL DOMESTIC WORKERS ALLIANCE, supra note 17. 
 20.  Ashar & Fisk, supra note 6, at 167. 
 21.  Shah, supra note 18, at 394. 
 22.  Terri Nilliasca, Some Women’s Work: Domestic Work, Class, Race, Heteropatriarchy, and 
the Limits of Legal Reform, 16 MICH. J. RACE & L. 377, 409 (2011). 
 23.  See, e.g., Nik Theodore, Rebuilding the House of Labor: Unions and Worker Centers in the 
Residential Construction Industry, 18 WORKINGUSA: J. LAB. & SOC’Y 59 (2015). 
 24.  Sarmiento et al., supra note 15, at 141. 
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B. Food Service 
Organizing focused on low-wage work has concentrated on food ser-
vice, as it is an area of extremely low wages (in many states, the hourly 
minimum wage is the federal subminimum wage of $2.13 for tipped em-
ployees), rampant noncompliance with minimum labor standards, and sex-
ual harassment.26 Organizing in food service has taken many forms over 
the last decade; most illustrate core aspects of the Alt-Labor models. 
The organizing is multifaceted, multi-institutional, and sectoral. And, 
importantly for purposes of considering sustainability, it aims to link policy 
or legislative campaigns to the formation of organizations that will last 
beyond a legislative win. ROC United’s strategy is illustrative. Its approach 
is “rooted in people” and works by engaging restaurant workers, high road 
employers, and consumers in campaigns and organizations simultaneous-
ly.27 ROC engages workers through job training and placement (it has res-
taurants and a job training program) and through civic engagement and 
leadership development by involving workers in its One Fair Wage cam-
paigns in various states to eliminate the subminimum wage for tipped em-
ployees. It engages employers through its employer association, RAISE, 
which provides training, technical assistance, and a peer network. And it 
engages consumers through Diners United, a “conscious consumer associa-
tion.”28
Other organizations too are organizing or have organized in food ser-
vice. The Fight for 15 campaign scored huge successes in raising the mini-
mum wage in many states to $15 per hour and in challenging legal 
structures that allow franchisors to disclaim any liability for labor viola-
tions in restaurants operated by franchisees.29
The Culinary Workers Union Local 226 in Las Vegas has achieved a 
level of sustainability that has yet to be achieved by worker formations 
elsewhere in food service in the contemporary moment.30 Part of its success 
 26.  See JAYARAMAN, supra note 6; Andrew Elmore, Franchise Regulation for the Fissured 
Economy, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2018). 
 27.  Our Work, RESTAURANT OPPORTUNITIES CTRS. UNITED, https://rocunited.org/mission/ 
[https://perma.cc/M5VH-2L5Z] (last visited Mar. 24, 2020). 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  This is not to overlook the significant organizing that has occurred in food production and 
distribution. And, indeed, the Coalition of Immokalee Workers’ Fair Food Program, which is based on 
supply chain contracts that ensure that a tiny price increase paid by consumers is passed down through 
the many levels of contracts to result in higher pay for Florida farmworkers who tend and harvest 
tomatoes, has achieved remarkable durability in the production and distribution, but it has not yet grown 
to encompass the food supply chain generally. FAIR FOOD PROGRAM, http://www.fairfoodprogram.org. 
 30.  See Dorothy Benz, Labor’s Ace in the Hole: Casino Organizing in Law Vegas, 26 NEW POL.
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and sustainability comes from its provision of benefits on a sectoral basis, 
but its real power comes from organizing and representing workers at each 
and all of the major enterprises in the Las Vegas hospitality and gaming 
industry.31
C. Misclassification 
A third type of campaign has been to end misclassification of workers 
as independent contractors. The campaign in California got a kickstart in 
May 2018 when the California Supreme Court decided, unanimously, that a 
logistics company called Dynamex was the employer of its drivers.32 The 
Court’s adoption of the employee-protective ABC test in place of the more 
easily evaded multi-factor test under California wage and hour law did not 
immediately change working conditions for the tens of thousands of Uber, 
Lyft, or Door Dash drivers, Amazon delivery people, or other misclassified 
workers, as companies seemed to ignore it.33 Thus, Dynamex looked like 
the litigation that resulted in Brown v. Board of Education. But the story 
did not stop there. Building on that litigation victory, organized labor 
groups in California, with nationwide support, supported legislation (As-
sembly Bill 5) to extend the Dynamex ABC rule to all provisions of the 
California labor code.34
Neither Dynamex nor AB 5 has yet  to have any major effect on the 
working conditions of app-based ride hailing drivers, as Uber’s general 
counsel publicly announced the company has no intention of complying 
with the law when it went into effect on January 1, 2020.35 It appears that 
90% on the Strip at a time when private sector union density nationwide was about 8%); Courtney 
Alexander, Rise to Power: The Recent History of the Culinary Union in Law Vegas, in THE GRIT 
BENEATH THE GLITTER: TALES FROM THE REAL LAS VEGAS 145–46 (Hal K. Rothman & Mike Davis 
eds., 2002) (describing the success of the Culinary Workers Local 226). 
 31.  See Matthew Ginsburg, Nothing New Under the Sun: “The New Labor Law” Must Still 
grapple with the Traditional Challenges of Firm-Based Organizing and Building Self-Sustainable 
Worker Organizations, 126 YALE L.J. F. 488, 490 (2017) (arguing that “[t]here is simply no way to 
rebuild the labor movement at scale without facing [the] challenge” of organizing workers at each 
enterprise where they work). 
 32.  Dynamex Operations West v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903, 966–67 (2018). 
 33.  Levi Sumagaysay, Uber Defiant as Gig Workers on Verge of Becoming Employees Under AB 
5, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.mercurynews.com/author/levi-sumagaysay/ 
[https://perma.cc/U7EU-3ZWN]. 
 34.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 2750.3 (WEST 2019); AB-5 Worker status: employees and independent 
contractors, CAL. LEGIS. INFO. (Sept. 19, 2019, 4:00 AM), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201920200AB5 
[https://perma.cc/E6KS-3TNW]. 
 35.  See supra note 34; Shirin Ghaffary, Uber and Lyft Say They Don’t Plan to Reclassify Their 
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neither Uber nor any of the other app-based service companies (Lyft, Task 
Rabbit, DoorDash, etc.) have altered their labor practices, even though 
California law has required them to pay the minimum wage since May 
2018, when the state supreme court handed down Dynamex.
When the California governor signed AB 5 into law in September 
2019, worker organizing entered a new part of the path to end misclassifi-
cation because they secured a broad and decisive legal victory. But the 
legal fight is not over. Uber, Lyft, and Door Dash announced they are fund-
ing an effort to repeal AB 5 and overturn Dynamex by ballot initiative, and 
various industry groups sued to invalidate it.36
The legal fight may be long, perhaps endless.37 Meanwhile, the strug-
gle is to translate a legal win into a changed reality on the ground. That 
raises a question of institutionalization—how does a legal reform become 
institutionalized in such a way that it changes the law in action as well as 
the law on the books? It also raises a question of sustainability—if the his-
tory of the New Deal is that capitalists will seek to erode labor gains as 
soon as they are written into law and that eternal vigilance on labor’s part is 
the price of equality (to paraphrase), unions have the most to contribute to 
the question of sustainability of an equitable political economy. 
II. DECLINE AND REVIVAL AFTER THE LEGISLATIVE WIN
The heady days after the legislative wins of domestic worker bills of 
rights, local minimum wage increases, and AB 5 have prompted some who 
have been around the world of labor to recall the story of the California 
Agricultural Labor Relations Act and the tragic story of the United Farm 
Workers (UFW). How can labor ensure that the activism that produces 
these legislative successes will translate into sustainable and scalable im-
provements in working conditions and gains in worker power? 
Alt-Labor organizations today, like the UFW, are fundamentally sec-
toral, not enterprise-based. They focus on enacting and enforcing minimum 
standards legislation in low wage sectors, not enterprises (the grape fields 
and strawberry fields, restaurant, domestic work, day labor, app-based gig 
 36.  Kate Conger, Uber, Lyft, and DoorDash Pledge $90 Million to Fight Driver Legislation in 
California, N.Y. TIMES, (Aug. 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/29/technology/uber-lyft-
ballot-initiative.html [https://perma.cc/Z35B-SD97]; Scott Rodd, Uber, Lyft, Postmates Refuse to 
Comply with California Gig Economy Law, NPR (Jan. 4, 2020, 6:01 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2020/01/04/793142903/as-california-tries-to-make-contract-workers-employees-
industries-push-back [https://perma.cc/8WH5-5CDJ]. 
 37.  Janet Burns, Will Uber and Lyft Ever Stop Fighting Laws, Or Their Workers?, FORBES (Nov. 
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work, etc.). They rely on mobilizing workers in campaigns to publicize, 
stop, and remedy labor standards violations in sectors, and on campaigns to 
seek legislative or other legal change. Their goal is to use these proto-
sectoral forms of representation and law to end social exclusion. This is 
quite different from the nature of organizations envisioned by federal labor 
law. 
The problem is what happens after the campaign ends. Enduring 
worker power requires some form of institutionalization. Unions used to 
achieve that through enterprise-based collective bargaining and, occasion-
ally, sectoral multi-employer bargaining or established pattern bargaining 
relationships. But in the more flexible and fissured labor market of today 
and the future, it is necessary to develop other structures. 
Consider what happened to a labor movement success (the United 
Farm Workers) that failed to achieve institutional sustainability as a labor 
organization and a labor organization that gained and expanded power 
through movement activism (teachers’ unions). Both of these are long and 
complicated stories that I sketch only briefly. And it is fair to say that sig-
nificant controversy swirls around both the decline of the UFW and the 
evolution and strategy of teachers’ unions. The point of these sketches is to 
gesture toward the interdependence of movement activism and institutional 
power in sustaining labor power in the modern economy. 
After nearly twenty years of intense and creative organizing, the UFW 
secured the enactment of the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act 
(ALRA),38 which protects farmworkers’ right to unionize, and they used 
the power of the law to win recognition and contracts from some of the 
major growers across the state.39 But both before and after the ALRA went 
into effect in 1975, the UFW won elections and negotiated contracts for 
farmworkers up and down the state.40
But the power and the contracts did not last. For good or bad reasons, 
in the late 1970s and through the 1980s, the UFW focused more on person-
al transformation of its staff and on building Latinx political power and less 
on organizing farmworkers for collective bargaining or direct improvement 
working conditions.41 A decade before Cesar Chavez died in 1993, the 
 38.  CAL. LAB. CODE § 1140 (WEST 1995) 
 39.  See generally MIRIAM PAWEL, THE CRUSADES OF CESAR CHAVEZ (2014); MIRIAM PAWEL,
THE UNION OF THEIR DREAMS: POWER, HOPE, AND STRUGGLE IN CESAR CHAVEZ’S FARM WORKER 
MOVEMENT (2009) [hereinafter PAWEL, THE UNION OF THEIR DREAMS]; FRANK BARDACKE,
TRAMPLING OUT THE VINTAGE: CESAR CHAVEZ AND THE TWO SOULS OF THE UNITED FARM WORKERS 
(2011). 
 40.  PAWEL, THE UNION OF THEIR DREAMS, supra note 39, at 206. 
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union had few members and even fewer contracts imposing minimum labor 
standards and wages, and working conditions were as bad as ever. Alt-
hough the ALRA remains on the books and the California Agricultural 
Labor Relations Board still exists, it is an empty shell.42 Although the UFW 
claims just over 10,000 members, its strategies focus more on legislation to 
protect workers than on collective bargaining.43  While the story of how the 
UFW collapsed in the late 1970s and 1980s has been told and many causes 
contributed, one factor all can agree upon is the failure to transform effec-
tively from a social justice campaign to a union, and a failure to continue 
the work of being a movement that engages workers in self-governance. It 
remains unclear why it has yet to achieve a revival. 
The moral of the UFW story is that enacting protective labor law and 
creating an accessible enforcement framework to protect unions as collec-
tive bargaining entities are not by themselves enough to protect labor. A 
certain amount of movement activism is necessary to prevent the power of 
capitalists from crushing labor, and a certain amount of institutional lever-
age is necessary to provide the economic, political, social, and psychologi-
cal resources to sustain the movement.44
In contrast, the upsurge of activism of teachers since the Chicago 
teachers’ strike of 2012, and especially the Red for Ed movements that 
sprang into the news in April 2018, show that the revival of movement 
activism can be greatly facilitated by the institutional power and resources 
of labor unions, even where there is no legal right to bargain and, therefore, 
a relatively weak union.45 As Michael Oswalt and others have observed, 
recent teachers’ strikes, and the dramatic change in the goals and tactics of 
teachers—bargaining for the common good, focusing on taxation and dis-
investment in education—are classic examples of Alt-Labor goals and tac-
tics. Whether the union is leading from the front, as in Chicago, Minnesota, 
and California, or from behind, as in West Virginia and red states in spring 
2018, the resources of a union helps with publicity, media relations, and 
organizing.46 And bargaining relationships help protect against a quick 
 42.  In 2019, the ALRB issued eight decisions. In the first four months of 2020, it issued one. In 
contrast, in 1975 (its first year of operation), it issued 27 decisions and in 1976 it issued 63. See Case 
Decision Index, AGRIC. LAB. REL. BOARD, https://www.alrb.ca.gov/legal-searches/decision-index/ 
[https://perma.cc/3RWA-ENSP] for an annual index of ALRB decisions. 
 43.  See, e.g., Campaign News, UNITED FARM WORKERS, https://ufw.org/campaign-news/ 
[https://perma.cc/W82K-Y9B3] (last visited Dec. 6, 2019) (reporting legislative campaigns and no 
bargaining campaigns). 
 44.  See generally MARSHALL GANZ, WHY DAVID SOMETIMES WINS (2009). 
 45.  Michael M. Oswalt, Alt-Bargaining, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 89 (2019). 
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rollback of the strike’s gains once the TV cameras and social media fueled 
awareness fades.47
III. SUSTAINABLE ORGANIZATIONS AND PROTO-SECTORAL 
BARGAINING
Scholars and activists have explored a variety of legal frameworks and 
organizational forms that will enable effective regulation and sustainable 
worker empowerment.48 I discuss two reforms that can be implemented at a 
very local level, at a state level, or through federal legislation—co-
enforcement and hiring halls. 
A. Co-Enforcement 
State and local labor standards agencies in California have been exper-
imenting with collaborations with worker centers and other community 
groups as part of their enforcement efforts. The goal of these co-
enforcement programs is to improve compliance and enforcement by train-
ing workers and community groups in the law and using their networks and 
cultural and linguistic competence, along with their years of base-building 
and member organizing, to improve outreach to marginalized workers and 
increase worker awareness of their legal rights. Likewise, co-enforcement 
increases the effectiveness of enforcement officials by educating them 
about the problems faced by low-wage workers and the myriad ways in 
which employers avoid compliance. Co-enforcement also supports organiz-
ing and builds sustainable organizations by providing a formal role for 
worker and community groups in administering the law. Co-enforcement 
initiatives in the San Francisco Office of Labor Standards Enforcement 
(OLSE) and the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement 
(DLSE) have not only improved compliance and enforcement and en-
hanced the professional development, sophistication, and commitment of 
enforcement officials, they have modestly strengthened the finances of 
community groups, enhanced their legitimacy, and given low-wage work-
 47.  See Dana Goldstein, West Virginia Teachers Walk Out (Again) and Score a Win in Hours,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/us/teachers-strikes.html 
[https://perma.cc/VAT9-38JG] (teachers struck twice in a year to block legislation that would reduce 
public school funding). 
 48.  Among them are sectoral bargaining, the Ghent system, wage boards, and tripartism. See NO
ONE SIZE FITS ALL: WORKER ORGANIZATION, POLICY AND MOVEMENT FOR A NEW ECONOMIC AGE
(Janice Fine et al. eds., LERA Research Volume series, 2018); Kati Griffith & Leslie Gates, Worker 
Centers: Labor Law as Carrot, Not a Stick, 14 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2019); Kate 
Andrias & Benjamin Sachs (forthcoming 2019); Matthew Dimick, Labor Law, New Governance, and 
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ers most vulnerable to wage theft and other substandard working conditions 
a role in governance.49
There has long been a consensus in the literature that involvement of a 
worker group (usually a union) improves labor law compliance and en-
forcement.50 Formal involvement of a worker representative in enforce-
ment also creates an institutional role for a labor organization by 
legitimizing the organization in the eyes of workers, which is especially 
important either when employer opposition to the organization is vocifer-
ous and intense or when worker ignorance of the benefits of organizational 
affiliation makes it difficult to recruit committed and dues-paying mem-
bers. In a seminal article, Janice Fine and Jennifer Gordon proposed aug-
menting labor standards enforcement agencies by giving groups like unions 
and worker centers a formal, ongoing role in enforcement.51 Since then, the 
growing literature on co-enforcement has documented its effect in improv-
ing compliance and enforcement, especially in economic sectors with sub-
stantial immigrant populations where labor standards violations are 
endemic and difficult to eradicate.52
California has significant experience with co-enforcement at both the 
state and local level.53 In San Francisco, which has laws requiring a higher 
minimum wage, paid sick days, employer-provided health care, secure 
scheduling for retail workers, paid parental leave, pay equity, lactation 
accommodation, and more, the city Office of Labor Standards Enforcement 
 49.  See Ken Jacobs & Michael Reich, “When Do Mandates Work?,” in WHEN MANDATES 
WORK: RAISING LABOR STANDARDS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL 35 (Michael Reich, Ken Jacobs & Miranda 
Dietz eds., 2014). 
 50.  See generally DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR 
SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT (2014); Lawrence Mishel & Matthew Walters, 
How Unions Help All Workers, ECON. POL. INST. 13 (2003), http://www.epi.org/files/page/-
/old/briefingpapers/143/bp143.pdf [https://perma.cc/42GA-BZEC]; Alison D. Morantz, What Unions 
Do for Regulation, 13 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 515, 520 (2017). 
 51.  See generally Janice Fine & Jennifer Gordon, Strengthening Labor Standards Enforcement 
through Partnerships with Workers’ Organizations, 38 POL. & SOC’Y 552 (2010). 
 52.  See, e.g., Janice Fine, Enforcing Labor Standards in Partnership with Civil Society: Can Co-
enforcement Succeed Where the State Alone Has Failed? 45 POL. & SOC’Y 359, 359 (2017); Janice 
Fine & Gregory Lyon, Segmentation and the Role of Labor Standards Enforcement in Immigration 
Reform, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 431, 431 (2017); Matthew Amengual & Janice Fine, Co-
Enforcing Labor Standards: The Unique Contributions of State and Worker Organizations in Argentina 
and the United States, 11 REG. & GOVERNANCE 129, 129 (2017); DAVID MADLAND, THE FUTURE OF 
WORKER VOICE AND POWER, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (2016); DAVID MADLAND & ALEX ROWELL,
HOW STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS CAN STRENGTHEN WORKER POWER AND RAISE WAGES, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (2017); NAT’L EMP’T L. PROJECT, WINNING WAGE JUSTICE: AN ADVOCATE’S
GUIDE TO STATE AND CITY POLICIES TO FIGHT WAGE THEFT (Jan. 2011). 
 53.  Tia Koonse et al., Enforcing City Minimum Wage Laws in California: Best Practices and 
City-State Partnerships, UCLA CTR. LAB. RES. & EDUC., U.C. BERKELEY CTR. LAB. RES. & EDUC.
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(OLSE) has partnered with a number of community organizations in en-
forcing the municipal labor standards laws. 
Co-enforcement in San Francisco originated in its minimum wage or-
dinance, as amended in 2006, which requires that OLSE “establish a com-
munity-based outreach program to conduct education and outreach to [San 
Francisco] employees.”54 As the program evolved over time, OLSE sought 
partnerships with groups that could provide “education and outreach to 
workers in immigrant communities with limited English proficiency . . . in 
as many of the languages spoken by employees in San Francisco as possi-
ble.”55 One goal, OLSE explained, was “creating conditions in which these 
workers are more likely to report labor law violations.”56 OLSE structured 
co-enforcement in a series of multi-year contracts to provide sustained 
investment in community organizations that sought to build worker pow-
er.57
The Chinese Progressive Association (CPA), which had a long experi-
ence organizing in San Francisco’s low-wage and immigrant communities, 
became the prime contractor with the city on the co-enforcement initia-
tive.58 CPA had prevailed in several discrete high-profile wage theft recov-
ery cases,59 but wage theft remained rampant.”60 To reach beyond CPA’s 
own cultural, linguistic, and sectoral network, CPA subcontracted with 
seven other community partners in the monolingual Spanish-speaking 
community, the Filipino community, a number of Asian communities, a 
multi-racial and bilingual membership organization of young and immi-
grant workers, and a local chapter of the National Day Laborers Organizing 
Network (NDLON).61 Quarterly meetings of OLSE and community partner 
 54.  S.F. Admin. Code § 12R.25.  
 55.  Seema N. Patel & Catherine L. Fisk, California Co-Enforcement Initiatives that Facilitate 
Worker Organizing, HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 7 (2018), https://harvardlpr.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/20/2017/11/Patel-Fisk-CoEnforcement.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2EM-PAL9] 
(citation omitted). 
 56.  Id. at 7–8 (emphasis in original). 
 57.  Id. at 13.  
 58.  Mission and History, Chinese Progressive ASS’N., http://www.cpasf.org/mission 
[https://perma.cc/37FR-PDGM] (last visited Nov. 15, 2019). 
 59.  CPA won $525,000 in back pay and penalties for workers at Dick Lee Pastry. News Release, 
City Attorney of San Francisco, Wage theft lawsuit seeks to recover $440K in back pay, interest for 
cheated workers (July 12, 2011), https://www.sfcityattorney.org/2011/07/12/wage-theft-lawsuit-seeks-
to-recover-440k-in-back-pay-interest-for-cheated-workers/ [https://perma.cc/3DV2-SF3N]; Janice Fine, 
Co-Production: Bringing Together the Unique Capabilities of Government and Society for Stronger 
Labor Standards Enforcement, LAB. INNOVATIONS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY FUND 27 (Sept. 2015) 
http://theliftfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LIFTReportCoproductionOct_ExecSumm-rf_4.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/Q9GL-YW4X]. 
 60.  Patel & Fisk, supra note 55, at 7. 
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staff provided a forum for discussion of progress in enforcement activities, 
for relationship-building, and for discussion of new developments in law or 
policy. 
Because co-enforcement is implemented by a government contract, 
the relationship is governed by the exacting requirements of government 
contracts, which required community organizations to provide objective 
measures of enforcement success. But it requires creativity to figure out 
how to measure the deliverables in access to justice and in building trust 
among fearful low-wage immigrant workers. San Francisco phrased deliv-
erables in terms of community partners having specific numbers and types 
of contacts with low-wage workers in each partner’s linguistic or ethnic 
community (Chinese, Filipino, Latino, Vietnamese, Middle Eastern, Mus-
lim, and South Asian, and young workers).62 The community contractors 
were required to “resolve” or “refer” to OLSE, the California DLSE, or the 
federal DOL a specified number of “labor law complaints” per quarter.63 A 
specified number of worker consultations were required per year. Commu-
nity partners were also required to speak to a specified number of workers 
“directly and sharing linguistically and culturally appropriate information 
on San Francisco and California labor laws,” and to “conduct workshops 
designed to educate low-wage San Francisco workers on their rights under 
local and state labor law.”64
An early and significant co-enforcement success involved the workers 
at an upscale San Francisco dim sum restaurant known as Yank Sing in 
2013 and 2014. The community partners worked with the San Francisco 
OLSE and the California DLSE to negotiate the largest monetary settle-
ment either agency had achieved at that point in time ($4.25 million) for 
nearly 300 workers.65 With the support of the nonprofit groups and city and 
state agencies’ close scrutiny, the workers walked out during peak restau-
rant hours—an unusual display of concerted activity for a non-union work-
place. The employees got the company to agree to provide meal and rest 
breaks, paid sick days, wages that were higher than the local minimum 
(including a 5% raise for non-tipped workers), holiday pay and vacation 
pay, full health coverage for employees with no deductibles, and, because 
most workers have family in China, the right to take up to four weeks of 
approved time-off without risking their jobs. The settlement included im-
 62.  Patel & Fisk, supra note 55, at 13-14. 
 63.  Id. at 13. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Twilight Greenway, SF Restaurant Yank Sing Workers Earn Historic $4 Million Settlement,
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portant nonmonetary elements—an admission of guilt, an apology, and a 
commitment by the employer to righting the wrongs going forward—that 
sent a powerful message to both the worker community and industry play-
ers that organizing compels employers to comply with minimum standards 
and to treat their workers with respect. For the community organizers, the 
Yank Sing campaign represents the power of tying enforcement to organiz-
ing.66
California has a state-wide co-enforcement program that is in many 
ways similar to San Francisco’s.67 Through a partnership among DLSE, its 
Bureau of Field Enforcement (BOFE), the California affiliate of the Na-
tional Employment Law Project, and local worker organizations, the state 
has provided grants to several community organizations in San Francisco, 
Los Angeles, and rural Ventura County to target sectors with endemic 
wage theft. In the California program, as in San Francisco’s, each commu-
nity organization is responsible for identifying cases and bringing them to 
BOFE for enforcement action. BOFE and the community organization then 
work together on every step of the case. 
Unlike in San Francisco, which has OLSE in direct partnership with a 
handful of community organizations and worker centers, at the state-wide 
level, DLSE/BOFE partners with NELP and with community organiza-
tions. A NELP lawyer works with the community groups to identify wage 
theft cases, which the community group then presents to BOFE. BOFE then 
takes over prosecuting the case but relies on the community group for as-
sistance with identifying witnesses, gathering documentary evidence about 
wage practices, building trust among the workers (many of whom are un-
documented and distrustful of government agencies), and ensuring that the 
workers understand, participate in, benefit from, and are not retaliated 
against because of the enforcement activity. The program has provided 
annual retreats for BOFE staff and investigators to meet with worker activ-
ists to learn about labor practices in the low wage economy. 
The DLSE co-enforcement program has some structural features that 
give greater potential to support organizing than San Francisco’s model. 
Co-enforcement at DLSE is funded as a pilot project by the Irvine Founda-
tion. The private funding gives greater flexibility in how community groups 
can integrate outreach on labor standards with other outreach that the 
 66.  Patel & Fisk, supra note 55, at 3. 
 67.  The DLSE co-enforcement program is described in detail in Patel & Fisk, supra note 55, at 1, 
and in Fine & Lyon, supra note 52, at 442. See also 2017–2018 Fiscal Year Report on the Effectiveness 
of the Bureau of Field Enforcement, CAL. LAB. COMM’R OFF. (2018), 
https://www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/BOFE_LegReport2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/K4CN-5YWW] (describing 
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community group does. In other words, the pursuit of numerically defined 
deliverables need not be the primary driver of strategy. Lawyer-activists at 
both OLSE and NELP explain that building worker power cannot easily be 
quantified (especially without a dues model driving the organization), so 
the foundation funding allows the number of cases referred or resolved, or 
the number of trainings or worker meetings, to arise organically from or-
ganizing rather than organizing happening as a result of the pursuit of de-
liverables. 
Co-enforcement helps build sustainable worker organizations because 
it provides some funding, as well as legitimacy, and a direct connection to 
enforcement agencies that are important, if not always strictly necessary, 
for a worker group to have real power as an organization.  This matters 
enormously to worker centers and other groups that lack what made orga-
nized labor strong in its mid-twentieth century heyday: the dues model of 
funding, the collective bargaining relationship that confers legitimacy, and 
the budget to hire lobbyists and lawyers who will ensure a direct connec-
tion to government power. Co-enforcement also embeds a worker-oriented 
commitment throughout a bureaucracy so that enforcement is less subject 
to the vicissitudes of electoral politics. Co-enforcement grants help to sus-
tain the base-building organizations on which legal compliance depends. 
And the involvement of grassroots groups is the best insurance that the co-
enforcement ecosystem keeps the workers themselves involved. 
B. Hiring Halls 
A second way in which law can facilitate the translation of mobiliza-
tion into institutional power is to enable workers to form organizations that 
give them a greater role in job matching and labor market coordination. 
Law firms, hospitals, Uber, Care.com, and temp agencies are all institutions 
that match workers with those in need of services. What distinguishes law 
firms from all the rest is that law prohibits outside investors in law firms so 
that the lawyers themselves (or a subset of them) control the institution.68
Why not use law to give other workers greater control over the institutions 
in which they work – in other words, why not use law to expand the use of 
hiring halls throughout the economy? 
 68. Model Rule of Disciplinary Conduct 5.4 provides, in part, that lawyers may not form a part-
nership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law and 
may not practice with or in the form of a for-profit entity if a nonlawyer owns any interest in the prac-
tice or is a director or officer of the entity. See Gillian Hadfield, The Cost of Law: Promoting Access to 
Justice Through the (Un)Corporate Practice of Law, INT’L REV. L. & ECON. (2013) (advocating aban-
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Labor market coordination involves enormous effort and enormous 
power for those who do it, especially in sectors in which people switch jobs 
frequently or provide services to many different clients. Workers at all 
levels of skill, education, and compensation face daunting challenges in 
seeking new jobs. It takes time and effort to find, apply for, and interview 
for open jobs. Employers and employees alike waste time and resources 
seeking a match. Many employers demand more skills or credentials than 
they’re willing to pay for and focus on credentials rather than on compe-
tency, which creates disparate impacts on the basis of race, gender or gen-
der identity, disability, and background, including criminal records.69
Unscrupulous, low-road employment agencies have become the labor in-
termediaries in many industries.  These agencies engage in wage theft, 
charge exorbitant fees, prevent workers from using unemployment insur-
ance or workers’ compensation, and do not provide health benefits, vaca-
tion or sick days, or retirement plans. The many tech-enabled job matching 
services (Monster, Indeed, Glassdoor, Craigslist, or Care.com) that are 
pathways to jobs have no accountability to workers, give workers no voice 
in governance, and are strongly motivated to keep wages low and work 
union-free. In the app-enabled gig economy, companies like Uber, Lyft, 
Taskrabbit and Postmates have coordinated casual labor but eroded hard-
won employment protections by misclassifying workers as independent 
contractors while setting the price for their labor. 
If workers had power in the job-matching process, they could establish 
floors for wages and benefits, improve other workplace standards, create 
cross-firm benefits programs, and, most broadly, create an occupational 
identity of the sort that professionals enjoy.70 Union hiring halls have long 
played this role. A hiring hall—whether a physical space, such as a union 
hall, office, or dock, or a “virtual” hall,71 run through an online platform—
benefits employers and employees by facilitating job-matching, enables 
job-training and skills certification, creates the infrastructure to administer 
 69.  An overview of the challenges in contemporary job searches described in this paragraph and 
the role that unions and other worker formations could play in addressing them is David Rolf, A
Roadmap to Rebuilding Worker Power, THE CENTURY FOUND. (Aug. 9, 2018), 
https://tcf.org/content/report/roadmap-rebuilding-worker-power/?session=1&agreed=1 [per-
ma.cc/KV3C-YYK6]. 
 70.  See, e.g., Dorothy Sue Cobble, Organizing the Postindustrial Work Force: Lessons from the 
History of Waitress Unionism, 44(3) ILR REV. 419, 433 (1991).  
 71.  Unions have operated referral systems for which they have been permitted to charge fees to 
nonunion workers without an actual physical hall, as by screening workers, compiling and maintaining 
lists, contacting prospective workers, and reading names of eligible workers to employers over the 
phone or from a space in the employer’s premises. See, e.g., Toledo World Terminals, 289 N.L.R.B. 
670, 671-73 (1988); Plumbers Local Union No. 17, 224 N.L.R.B. 1262, enf’d, 575 F.2d 585, 586 (6th 
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sectoral benefits programs, and supports the development of an occupa-
tional identity. Referral and service-providing hiring halls could be central 
clearing houses where workers congregate and connect to resources and 
services, including child care and organized leisure activities, all while 
taking back from employment agencies control over work schedules.72
Hiring halls can require both union members and nonmembers to ad-
here to reasonable, non-discriminatory rules that are designed to ensure the 
hall’s effective operation.73  Reasonable rules can include adherence to 
rules regarding timeliness or reliability in reporting to work and adherence 
to specific standards regarding pay and quality of work.74
Historically, unions have sought hiring halls to be an exclusive ar-
rangement in which an employer grants the union operating the hiring hall 
the exclusive right to refer employees, and the employer cannot hire from 
any other source.75 Even Senator Taft, a principal author of the Taft-
Hartley Act which restricted various union security devices, recognized 
that “the union frequently is the best employment agency,” and union hir-
ing halls benefit employers, employees, and the public by reducing wasted 
effort in job-seeking, reducing corruption and favoritism in job-matching, 
 72.  The balance between leadership development, skills enhancement, and community organizing 
of the worker organization is a matter of lively discussion among worker center leaders. See generally
Oswalt & Rosado-Marzán, supra note 8; Cesar F. Rosado Marzán, Worker Centers and the Moral 
Economy: Disrupting Through Brokerage, Prestige, and Moral Framing, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 409 
(2018); Rebecca J. Livengood, Organizing for Structural Change: The Potential and Promise of Work-
er Centers, 48 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 325 (2013); Dorothy Sue Cobble, Lost Ways of Unionism: 
Historical Perspectives on Reinventing the Labor Movement, in REKINDLING THE MOVEMENT:
LABOR’S QUEST FOR RELEVANCE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 82–96 (Lowell Turner, Harry C. 
Katz and Richard W. Hurd eds., 2001); Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant 
Workers, the Workplace Project and the Struggle for Social Change Symposium: Economic Justice in 
America’s Cities: Visions and Revisions of a Movement, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407 (1995). 
 73.  Courts have consistently treated hiring halls as distinct from union security agreements gener-
ally and have recognized that nondiscriminatory exclusive hiring halls are not synonymous with closed 
shops. They are not per se unlawful under the NLRA, and unions retain considerable discretion in 
structuring their operations so long as they are not operated in a discriminatory fashion. Local 357 Int’l 
Bhd. of Teamsters v. N.L.R.B., 365 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1961). Hiring halls are legal as long as all workers 
are allowed to enroll in a hiring register regardless of union membership and are treated equally under 
the rules established by the hiring hall for job placement.   
 74.  In IATSE, Local 838 (Freeman Decorating), 364 N.L.R.B. No. 81 (2016), the Board ruled 
that a union does not violate Section 8(b)(1)(A) by maintaining a hiring hall that required users to pay 
fines to the union if they failed to report for work and permanently removed workers from the referral 
list after a fourth attendance offense. The Board majority found that a rebuttable presumption of a 
violation of Section 8(b)(1)(A) arises when a union takes action that affects a referent’s employment 
status for reasons other than the failure to pay dues or other fees uniformly required. However, the 
union rebutted the presumption because its rule was reasonably designed to ensure effective operation 
of its hiring hall by protecting its relationship with employers to which it supplied labor. This case 
shows that hiring halls have discretion to establish and enforce norms and standards throughout an 
industry. 
 75.  See generally Pittsburgh Press Co. v. N.L.R.B., 977 F.2d 652 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (discussing the 
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and protecting workers who might otherwise be “at the mercy of petty 
racketeers who demanded kick-backs” for job referrals.”76  The NLRB has 
long endorsed hiring halls because they “eliminate wasteful, time-
consuming and repetitive scouting for jobs by individual workers and hap-
hazard uneconomical searches by employers.”77
Exclusive hiring halls are almost always established by collective bar-
gaining agreements and are prohibited by the NLRA’s ban on closed shops 
only if the hiring hall refuses to refer non-union workers even if they are 
willing to pay a reasonable fee tied to the pro rata cost of the operation of 
the hiring hall.78 In nonexclusive arrangements, the union’s hiring hall is 
only one of many possible sources of employees. In either case, under fed-
eral labor law, a union-run hiring hall cannot deny employees access on the 
basis of union membership but can charge nonmembers a reasonable fee 
tied to the pro rata cost of operating the hall.79 Workers who want to join 
the union would pay union dues, part of which would cover the hiring hall 
referral fee. 
Enabling unions and other labor organizations to operate non-
discriminatory exclusive hiring halls, even in states that bar union security 
agreements, generates power for workers over their employment.  Achiev-
ing this level of worker solidarity and control over labor supply affords the 
hiring hall operator the bargaining leverage needed to improve significantly 
the referred workers’ terms and conditions of employment.  Non-exclusive 
hiring hall arrangements, where a union or other entity is not the only sup-
plier of labor to an employer, are also an option and would allow for a 
members-only model.  Such an arrangement, however, would not succeed 
 76.  SUBCOMM. ON LAB.-MGMT. REL. OF THE S. COMM. ON LAB. AND PUB. WELFARE, MARITIME
HIRING HALLS, S. REP. NO. 1827, at 6–7, 13 (81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1950) (additional views of Sen. Taft). 
 77.  Mountain Pac. Chapter of Assoc. Gen. Contractors v. N.L.R.B., 119 N.L.R.B. 883, 896 n.8 
(1958), enf. denied in par byt, 306 F.2d 34 (9th Cir. 1962), overruled in part by, Int’l Bhd. Teamsters, 
Local 357 v. N.L.R.B., 365 U.S. 667 (1961).  
 78.  See Local 357, Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. N.L.R.B., 365 U.S. 667, 673-74 (1961); Radio 
Officers’ Union v. N.L.R.B., 347 U.S. 17, 40-42 (1954). 
 79.  Pittsburgh Press Co., 977 F.2d at 655. For example, Simms v. Local 1752, Int’l Longshore-
man Ass’n, 838 F.3d 613 (5th Cir. 2016), rejected a legal challenge to an exclusive union hiring hall in 
a suit brought by a nonmember in a right to work state. The nonmember who was denied referral for 
employment because of his failure to pay the union a reasonable fee for use of the hiring hall alleged 
that Mississippi’s right to work law prohibited the union’s assessment of mandatory fees for a nonunion 
member for use of the hiring hall. The plaintiff’s theory was that hiring hall fees amount to compulsory 
union membership, which states can prohibit under Section 14(b) of the NLRA. The court held that the 
NLRA allows states to prohibit unions and employers to agree to conditions that come into effect after 
an individual is hired, not to the hiring process itself. See Oil, Chem & Atomic Workers Int’l Union, 
AFL-CIO v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 US 407, 417 (1976) (holding that hiring hall fees do not compel 
union membership); Pittsburgh Press Co. 977 F.2d at 657 (observing that “Congress, the Supreme 
Court, and the NLRB . . . agreed on the basic principles of a legitimate hiring hall for which non-union 
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in improving labor standards unless the union represents a substantial ma-
jority in the sector and its members have uniquely valuable skills. Without 
that, the hiring hall cannot effectively raise standards in the sector because 
low-wage competition will remain a constant threat. 
Hiring hall operators could offer, in addition to job placement, any 
number of members-only services and benefits: training, health benefits, 
retirement benefits, death benefits, funds for funeral expenses, financial 
assistance during illness, loans from treasury after exhaustion of sick bene-
fits, child care, free or low cost attorney services, free or low cost medical 
care, unemployment insurance, workers’ compensation, no cost travel to 
and from work, home loans, and help establishing bank accounts. The Cul-
inary Union in Las Vegas is a good example of a union that provides excel-
lent benefits to its hiring hall users.80  In fact, unions in Las Vegas, 
operating in a state that bans union security agreements, have been able to 
build substantial power, in part through the use of hiring halls. But the Cul-
inary Union, and other successful instances of unions operating hiring 
halls, all exist in a context where the union is also the exclusive bargaining 
representative once the workers are hired.  It is an open question as to how 
effective a hiring hall would be if the employer does not also recognize the 
union as the employees’ representative after they are hired. 
The goals of labor unions, worker centers, and community-based 
worker advocacy groups are sufficiently aligned such that they can be a 
complement to one another, as opposed to being in competition with one 
another, in the operation of a hiring hall.  For example, worker centers’ 
deep connections to the communities they serve and awareness of the par-
ticular needs of their constituencies, and unions’ experiences in collective 
bargaining and building political power, can reinforce each other and make 
collaboration between them mutually beneficial.  As noted above, the Na-
tional Domestic Workers Alliance has already developed online platforms 
to facilitate hiring in home care and cleaning workers and to provide porta-
ble benefits for workers.81 Taking control of a labor supply in a local or 
regional occupational market requires members, allied organizations, and 
others to support or engage in collective actions to overcome employer and 
establishment opposition. 
Hiring halls of today must not be limited to serving only those who 
qualify as statutory employees. Rather, those not covered under the NLRB 
 80.  See For Members / Benefits, CULINARY WORKERS UNION LOCAL 226, 
https://www.culinaryunion226.org/members/benefits [https://perma.cc/KH9S-M9F9] (last visited Jan. 
7, 2020). 
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(independent contractors, low-level supervisors, agricultural workers, and 
domestic workers) can and should be included.82  Focusing on the best 
practices from the traditions of community and labor organizing can help to 
build effective hiring halls, including a unionism with fluid, porous mem-
bership boundaries that shift as the nature of work shifts, and structural 
capacity to organize occupationally and geographically as well as industri-
ally. In addition, hiring halls that are run by worker organizations can pro-
vide a structure in which all levels—national, local, state, and regional—
are activated and empowered economically as well as politically.83
A hiring hall could be created by statute in the contemporary app-
based gig economy by incentivizing co-op based employment as a source 
of labor supply for platform companies such as Uber. It could gain political 
traction if agreeing to source labor through a worker-controlled co-op were 
a condition of an exemption from certain minimum labor standards laws 
like California’s AB 5. That is, a worker co-operative system could give 
workers control over job-matching regardless of whether the workers are 
employees or independent contractors. But if the workers were independent 
contractors, the platform company would be relieved of responsibility for 
compliance with minimum labor standards laws, and the co-operatives 
would negotiate the price of labor with the company and would administer 
benefits systems. The idea would be that workers hired through a licensed 
 82.  Gonos and Martino provide a comprehensive strategy for such temp workers that transcends 
production. It includes: (1) forming regional temp workers’ associations and creating work councils 
which serve as organizing committees that build broader community coalitions; (2) building coalitions 
to engage communities in statewide actions in order to generate widespread condemnation of abusive 
temp agency practices and to disrupt supply of labor to and from them; (3) launching a hiring hall 
operation inside a targeted high road employment agency and dividing up responsibilities; (4) creating 
responsible employer pacts signed with these partner agencies/employers; (5) forming partnerships 
where unions organize those workers falling under the NLRA and worker centers/community based 
organizations work with the rest; (6) coordinating efforts at targeted facilities so that certain employers 
are persuaded to use the hiring hall to meet their flexible labor needs and to voluntarily recognize the 
union; (7) ensuring that CBAs negotiated by unions would spell out temp workers’ terms and conditions 
and would regulate temp usage (8) creating multi-employer associations between unions/worker centers 
and temp agencies/employers that sets a minimum living wage and guarantee of minimum number of 
paid daily hours for a dispatched worker. See George Gonos & Carmen Martino, Temp Agency Workers 
in New Jersey’s Logistics Hub: The Case for a Union Hiring Hall, 14 WORKINGUSA: J. LAB. & SOC’Y
499 (2011). 
 83.  Occupational unionism is characterized by four overlapping categories: occupational identity, 
control over the labor supply in the occupation, rights and benefits as a function of occupational mem-
bership rather than worksite affiliation, and peer control over performance standards and workplace 
discipline. It was similar to craft unionism with emphasis on craft specialization, restrictive membership 
rules and union monitoring of performance standards, but also had characteristics common with organi-
zations formed by non-factory (skilled and unskilled) workers (longshoremen, agricultural, building 
tradesmen, musicians, teamsters) in that it stressed employment security rather than job rights at a 
particular facility (work sharing principles in downswings) and offered portable benefits (health and 
welfare funds bound members emotionally as well as financially to the locals and its members). See
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labor cooperative with democratic worker control (where the licensing 
requirement would ensure that workers actually control the co-op) would 
be exempt from specified statutory minimum standards, thus giving plat-
form companies an incentive to hire them and relieving them of responsi-
bility for compliance with complex labor laws. Legislation could ensure 
that co-ops were worker controlled by creating a nonprofit mutual benefit 
corporation to be the federation of labor co-ops (and which could negotiate 
on a sectoral basis over minimum terms) and would partner with the state 
department of labor to ensure that the co-ops were democratically governed 
by the workers. The basic principles of such a system would be the follow-
ing: 
1. open and voluntary membership, which would include uniform 
hiring criteria for applicant workers and uniform membership 
criteria for co-op worker owners; 
2. worker ownership of the co-op, including a right of distribution 
of net income to the worker owners; and 
3. worker control of the co-op and the federation on a one-person, 
one-vote basis. 
Hiring halls or worker co-ops could be a partnership of unions and 
worker centers. For example, a collaboration between the National Day 
Laborer Organizing Network, LIUNA, and the AFL-CIO shows that day 
labor worker centers can be strong union allies and key players in the cur-
rent labor movement.  Worker centers are effective mechanisms for organ-
izing workers, monitoring industry conditions, and strengthening worker 
protections.  On the demand side, they increase transparency of the hiring 
hall process and provide a means by which to hold employers accountable 
for maintaining labor standards, while on the supply side they provide the 
day laborers, monitor work quality, and provide opportunities for worker 
incorporation into the mainstream economy through job search and assis-
tance.84
Hiring halls could be the base from which sectoral representation 
could grow.  Individuals from an ethnic neighborhood or an occupational 
community could become members of a union or a worker organization.  
The members would elect a group from among their ranks that would help 
the organization to develop the hiring hall rules and administer the opera-
tions. The organization would train interested members in negotiation and 
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public speaking, trade skills, and operational administration, and would 
educate them about wages, benefits, and labor standards in relevant sectors, 
regionally and more broadly, as well as in federal, state, and local labor and 
employment statutes. 
These workers would be primed to act effectively on works councils at 
their specific workplace. They would also be trained to participate in wage 
or standards board discussions with local government officials, union and 
employer representatives and others in their community in a co-
enforcement or sectoral bargaining scenario.  This would also pave the way 
for union representation at the worksite, whether exclusive representation 
or minority graduated representation, as the hiring hall organization would 
have built a productive and supportive relationship with the referred work-
ers. 
Community-based organizations that operate high-road hiring halls 
can develop strong ties of trust and loyalty to a community, which 
strengthens their role in sector-specific, multi-community organizing. 
Whether or not the organization is a labor union, it could partner with un-
ions or national organizations with significant experience and infrastructure 
around workplace and political action.  This includes political action out-
side of the workplace as well as direct economic intervention within the 
workplace, and both are mutually reinforcing as the group cohesion needed 
to enforce direct action can also translate into a united voice at the polls.  
Direct action in which unions are well-versed, such as civil disobedience, 
boycotts, picketing, flash mobs, and strikes, is necessary if a community-
based hiring hall is to compete with low road employment agencies in or-
der to disrupt the supply of labor from these agencies. Further, in partner-
ing with a union, they gain experience in building worker power in the 
industry, turning control of the labor market into bargaining strength, and 
establishing formal relationships with employers. 
A number of legal and policy reforms are necessary to create hiring 
halls on a widespread basis. The nature of the legal reforms may depend on 
the entity that operates the hiring hall and the structure of the sector in 
which it operates. 
For sectors that are structured like construction, in which many small 
business employers hire workers on a short-term basis, unions have long 
operated hiring halls to aid the rapid matching of skilled labor to the epi-
sodic needs of construction contractors. The construction trades unions 
negotiate collective bargaining agreements with contractors before the la-
bor force is hired for any particular job so that the contractor can gain ac-
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hire agreements. Expanding lawfulness of pre-hire agreements to non-
construction industries with similar high-velocity labor markets would 
allow hiring halls to expand beyond construction. This could be important 
in agriculture and other seasonal work. 
In other industries in which the demand for labor fluctuates slightly 
but the employer base is stable, as in longshore work, the hiring hall oper-
ated like a day labor market. On the west coast, the International Longshore 
and Warehouse Union ended the abuses of the day labor market by negoti-
ating with all the west coast stevedoring companies to hire longshoremen 
only from the ILWU hiring hall. Although the advent of containerized 
shipping eliminated the day labor aspect of longshore work (and dramati-
cally reduced employment), the hiring hall still operates as a way to place 
skill union labor in available positions. The ILWU originally had closed-
shop agreements with the stevedoring companies that required them to hire 
only from the ILWU hiring hall and required workers to participate in a 
hiring hall in order to gain employment. So long as access to union or 
worker organization membership is open to all (as it was with the ILWU), 
there would be no legal obstacle to a closed-shop agreement.85
Law should rationalize the circumstances in which group action set-
ting the minimum terms of labor is lawful and when it is an antitrust viola-
tion. Unionized hiring hall relationships allow employers and workers, 
acting collectively through their union, to agree on the price and terms of 
labor. This raises no antitrust issue because of the labor exemption to anti-
trust.86 Today, Uber, Lyft, Door Dash and other app-based service provid-
ers unilaterally set the price and terms of labor. This, the companies argue, 
raises no antitrust issue because the price coordination happens within the 
boundary of the firm.87 Critics disagree.88 And when a labor contractor 
agrees to supply labor at a set price and then refuses to negotiate with the 
workers over a wage, that, too, should be seen to raise antitrust issues, 
though it has not to date. Under current law, however, a worker-operated 
hiring hall that is not the product of a collective bargaining agreement 
would probably, at least by business, be thought to raise an antitrust prob-
lem to the extent it involves workers as a group agreeing to set a minimum 
 85.  See supra text accompanying notes 74-80.  
 86.  See Brown v. Prof’l Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996); F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Law-
yers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
 87.  See Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power, 82 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 45 (2019). 
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price for their labor.89 There is no reason why only firms or collective bar-
gaining agreements, and not worker groups, can set the price of services or 
otherwise coordinate the labor market.90 But if courts were to conclude it 
does, then a change in antitrust law would be necessary to expand the hir-
ing hall framework. 
Law should also facilitate negotiation between employers and labor 
organizations to address the fissurization of work and the need to allow 
unions and companies flexibility to have their contract follow the work. 
The duty to bargain under section 8(a)(5) should allow unions to insist that 
collective bargaining agreements address subcontracting, thus allowing 
hiring halls to follow the work.91
A more ambitious set of legal reforms would give to worker-owned 
employment agencies (which is what hiring halls are) the same legal ad-
vantages enjoyed by for-profit employment agencies. Under current law, 
unions that operate hiring halls have extensive reporting requirements to 
government and disclosure requirements to members. Law should require 
non-union, for-profit employment agencies to engage in the same reporting 
and disclosure as the law requires of unions. Alternatively, and much more 
ambitiously, the law would empower workers through a hiring hall struc-
ture that would require that any organization engaged in employment refer-
rals and in interstate commerce either be operated by, or in equal 
partnership with, a union or other bona-fide non-profit worker organization 
or be operated.  Functionally, this would require firms ranging from Kelly 
Service and Manpower to Uber and TaskRabbit to enter into labor partner-
ship agreements in order to continue operating their existing lines of busi-
ness. A slightly less forceful approach would be the labor co-op system 
described above: for-profit companies could gain an exemption form cer-
tain minimum standards legislation (such as laws designating workers as 
employees) if the source their workers from a worker-controlled co-op.92
 89.  See Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 411; Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. 
United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978) (holding professional organization’s ethics rule prohibiting 
members from bidding against each other as to minimum fee violates antitrust law); Goldfarb v. Va. 
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793 (1975) (holding minimum fee schedule adopted by lawyers violated 
antitrust law).  
 90.  Sanjukta Paul, Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights, 67 UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming 
2020); Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power, 82 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 45 (2019). 
 91.  First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 452 U.S. 666 (1981) (holding that janitorial services 
contractor had no duty to bargain with union representing its employees over the contractor’s decision 
to terminate service at a location which would result in layoff of janitors working at that location). 
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It would also be possible to expand the role of hiring halls to assume 
broader functions of unions or Taft-Hartley benefit plans themselves—
benefit administration, training, codetermination, co-enforcement—on a 
portable basis. This would require legal changes in the regulation of unions 
and in the regulation of benefit plans. 
States or municipalities could serve as laboratories for experimenta-
tion with hiring halls by provide government funding to hiring halls. Or 
they could require any public-sector employer or employer receiving sub-
stantial government funds to use the community hiring hall for some or all 
of its workforce needs. Alternatively, government could subsidize the train-
ing or education of workers on a pro rata share based on the number of 
those that are referred. 
Any hiring hall would require some source of funding to support the 
cost of its operations. The more training it does, or the more benefits or 
services it provides, the greater its costs. As with other employment agen-
cies, hiring halls would charge fees to employers, and perhaps dues to its 
employee members. Group discounts for these benefits and services would 
make membership more attractive.  For example, a coalition of different 
unions could collaborate to provide substantial services to members at a 
very low cost. 
Hiring halls could also be the basis of a Ghent system.93 That is, they 
could replace or augment employers or governments as providers of paid 
benefits, such as for unemployment, work-related injury, medical, retire-
ment, parental leave, death, or disability. They would receive the funding 
from these sources for sustainability, such as through federal and state 
grants. Organizing around benefits allows unions to regularly connect with 
workers as whole people—who need health care, have children, hope to 
retire. 
In order for hiring halls to not replicate the grim history of racial, gen-
der, and other forms of exclusion, it is important that hiring hall organiza-
tions have operations in low-income, disadvantaged communities. They 
should have the elected members monitor compliance with rules so that 
they are not discriminatorily applied. The government could also have a 
certification requirement to ensure that a certain percentage of the organi-
zation’s hiring hall operations are in particular zip codes. In the past, some 
hiring halls have been guilty of illegal discrimination, typically in order to 
facilitate greater employment and earning opportunities for members of a 
dominant racial, ethnic, national, or gender group allied with union leader-
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ship. Diversity in union and worker center leadership, and making hiring 
halls open to all, will prevent a recurrence of the old discrimination. Re-
gardless of union affiliation, hiring halls, bilateral labor marketplaces, and 
employment placement and referral agencies should be covered by anti-
discrimination laws; government agencies should be adequately resourced 
to enforce those laws; and government funding and contracts should be 
contingent on demonstrating compliance with applicable anti-
discrimination laws. 
* * *
There is a significant and deeper theoretical debate underlying the 
question of whether gaining institutional power will necessarily weaken 
labor as a movement. Saul Alinsky, the great theorist of social movement 
organizing, apparently thought so, on the ground that stable union contracts 
and the periodic rounds of collective bargaining enabled unions to improve 
wages and benefits without involving their members.94 Some observers of 
the UFW believed that it was the goal of the leadership to keep the move-
ment vibrant by focusing more on Latinx political power and grassroots 
community organizing than on negotiating and administering farmworker 
labor contracts. Others believe that it was the failure to keep the UFW as a 
democratically accountable, member-governed organization that led to its 
collapse, not that it gained institutional power through collective bargaining 
agreements.95
The relationship between law, institutional power, and movement vi-
brance is a huge topic beyond the scope of this essay. There is tension be-
tween the tendency toward hierarchy and bureaucratic control inherent in 
an institution and the goal of a movement to be democratic, bottom-up, and 
voluntaristic. Labor history is a story of struggle to gain and keep power 
over wages and working conditions against the constant threat that some 
workers will work for less money in order to get a competitive advantage. 
Unions have adopted a variety of coercive measures under the name of 
solidarity, and courts or legislatures have outlawed most of them.96 History 
 94.  See SAUL ALINSKY, REVEILLE FOR RADICALS (repr. ed/ 1969) (1946).  
 95.  See FRANK BARDACKE, TRAMPLING OUT THE VINTAGE: CESAR CHAVEZ AND THE TWO 
SOULS OF THE UNITED FARM WORKERS 72 (2011) (noting that Alinsky believed that unions were 
“languishing precisely because they have institutional power” that enables them “[t]hrough ritualized 
contract negotiations . . . [to] win higher wages without the active participation of their members” but 
suggesting that Alinsky erred in ignoring the “obvious alternative – for workers to fight within their 
unions for democratic unionism”). 
 96.  For example, the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited closed shops (agreements between unions and 
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has few examples of stable labor unions (or any other institutions) that are 
inclusive on the basis of race, class, gender, immigration status, and skill 
level, are truly and always voluntary, and are powerful. And in the highly 
partisan and rancorous time in which we live, any diverse organization will 
encounter difficulty in bridging the things that divide the members and to 
find common ground and to promote solidarity strong enough to enable the 
workers to get results from oppositional employers. 
CONCLUSION
To build enduring worker power from the activism and organizations 
of Alt-Labor requires thinking about how law could create institutional 
leverage for worker groups. If today’s organizing produces a new wave of 
labor power in blue states or nationally, they will be vulnerable to a pro-
business counter-revolution. Co-enforcement and legal support for expand-
ed and robust hiring halls are state level legal changes that can make Alt-
Labor movement activism sustainable and are building blocks to sectoral 
bargaining. 
Makers’ League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985) (invalidating union rules restricting members from 
resigning from the union during a strike, even though resignations were done to enable workers to cross 
the picket line without repercussions); NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S. 175 (1967) (upholding the 
power of a union to fine members for crossing a picket line; the power to fine is what creates the incen-
tive for members to resign from the union before crossing the picket line).  
